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FLEXING THE FRAME:  
TMT FRAMING AND THE ADOPTION OF NON-INCREMENTAL 
INNOVATIONS IN INCUMBENT FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Why do incumbent firms so frequently reject non-incremental innovations?  One reason 
is due to the firm’s top management team’s (TMT) lack of frame flexibility, i.e., an inability to 
expand the organization’s categorical boundaries so as to encompass a wider range of 
emotionally resonate capabilities in the context of innovative change.  For incumbent firms, we 
argue that the way the TMT cognitively thinks about, and emotionally frames, non-incremental 
innovation and organizational capabilities drives innovation adoption. We show that frame 
flexibility is both cognitive, through claimed beliefs and understandings, and emotional, through 
claimed appeals to feelings and aspirations. First, we reexamine an assumption that cognitive 
frames are static and suggest how they evolve to become flexible – via shifts in perceived 
categorical hierarchies and in the ability to reconcile incompatible organizational capabilities. 
Second, we theorize and attend to the role of emotional frames in innovation adoption.  Thus, we 
advance a model that articulates how cognitive and emotional framing affects the likelihood of 
non-incremental innovation adoption and, over time, the breadth of the organization’s innovation 
practices. We delineate these processes, as well as the internal and external contingencies that 
influence them, and offer directions for future research.   
 
Keywords: innovation adoption, cognition, framing, emotional resonance 
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Innovations are the lifeblood of any organization and yet their adoption poses 
considerable challenges to incumbent firms (Christensen, 1997: 317; Gans, 2016; Henderson, 
1993).  By definition, non-incremental innovations are inconsistent with an organization’s 
current product portfolio and business model (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Smith & Tushman, 
2005) and engender threats that can hold the incumbent organization hostage to its past (Vuori & 
Huy, 2016).  Top management teams (TMTs) often become mired in framing the innovation in 
terms of the organization’s past, rather than the future (Gilbert, 2006). Because of these inertial 
forces, incumbents frequently fail as product classes evolve (Benner & Tushman, 2003). 
Although scholars have documented numerous challenges attending the adoption of 
innovations, including resource allocation, technological demands, and business model 
incompatibilities (e.g., Danneels, 2011; Floyd & Lane, 2000), research on the TMT’s ability to 
effectively frame a potential innovation has received less attention in spite of the recognized 
need for such work (see recent calls from Eggers and Kaplan, 2013; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). A 
TMT’s framing of a focal innovation (i.e., the bracketing of attention so as to simplify 
understanding, interpretation, and evaluation of that innovation for the organization in terms of 
its alignment with the strategic direction of the firm) (e.g., Giorgi & Weber, 2015), can play a 
pivotal role in the TMT’s decision to adopt the innovation.  The divergent fates of two firms – 
Blockbuster and Netflix – provide a useful illustration.   
Prior to going bankrupt in 2010, Blockbuster’s TMT framed online streaming, a non-
incremental innovation, in ways that conflicted with the company’s legacy strategy as a brick-
and-mortar video rental service.  In 2000, Netflix’s CEO approached Blockbuster about forming 
a partnership to pursue an online streaming platform. However, he “got laughed out of the room” 
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(Satell, 2014:1 ) and the innovation was rejected by Blockbuster’s TMT because they perceived 
it to be strategically incongruent with their existing business model (Newman, 2010).  
By contrast, the TMT at Netflix was able to frame online streaming more flexibly as an 
extension of “entrainment subscription services,” and thus, saw it as compatible with their 
current capabilities in DVD rentals. They did this by broadening their framing, so as to see a 
potential alignment between the innovation and organizational capabilities; and importantly, they 
cast the innovation as an organizational aspiration to provide consumers with “value, 
convenience, and selection” (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2016: 6).  This flexibility in framing, 
reflected by cognitive expansion and emotional expressiveness, abetted the adoption of online 
streaming services and content production.  Soon, Blockbuster’s advantage disappeared (c.f. 
Rothaermel, 2001) as its TMT continued to frame the organization in terms of its legacy strategy, 
i.e., brick-and-mortar video rentals.  Years later,  Blockbuster’s former CEO expressed his regret 
at the innovation framing: “I firmly believe that if our online strategy had not been abandoned, 
Blockbuster Online would have 10 million subscribers today, and we’d be rivaling Netflix for 
the leadership position in the internet downloading business” (Antioco, 2011: 1).  It was as 
Eggers and Kaplan (2013: 317) observed:  “[managers’] frames are stuck in an old understanding 
of the environment.”  Thus, we propose, it was framing that lacked strategic resonance that 
contributed to Blockbuster’s inability to adapt to technological change. 
The contrast between Blockbuster and Netflix raises questions of how and why some 
TMTs are able to frame target innovations more effectively so as to enhance their suitability with 
the organization’s strategy.  Researchers studying framing have shown that a foundational 
mechanism for frame effectiveness is its perceived alignment or resonance (Benford & Snow, 
2000; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010), which can influence audiences and guide strategic direction 
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(Hardy, Palmer, & Phillips, 2000; Steyaert & Hjorth, 2008).  Innovation adoption, because of its 
inherent uncertainty and equivocality (Weick, 1990), calls for effective framing if adoption is to  
achieve strategic resonance.  Untested and unfamiliar non-incremental innovations, like most 
objects of framing, can elicit multiple, and even conflicting, meanings, particularly as the TMT 
positions the innovation in light of the firm’s existing strategy, product portfolio, capabilities, 
and business model (Helfat et al., 2009; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011).  As Snow and colleagues 
(1986: 477, cited in Giorgi, forthcoming) point out, “many framings may be plausible, but (…) 
relatively few strike a responsive chord.”  Striking that responsive chord, or being strategically 
resonant, we argue, is key for effective framing by the TMT and, in turn, the strategic decision to 
adopt an innovation.  As Eggers and Kaplan (2013: 313) observe, “Frames, therefore, shape the 
organization’s dedication of scarce resources to one capability or another (Laamanen & Wallin, 
2009). This resource allocation process is the central task of strategic management (Bower, 
1970).” 
Framing is the process of formulating interpretations “to locate, perceive, identify, and 
label” events or choices (Goffman, 1974: 21) to organize, clarify, and render understandable 
experience and guide decision-making (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014).  Frames are “action-
oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate activities” (Snow & Benford, 
1988: 198) and have been widely applied to understand mobilization in social movement 
organizations (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003), category emergence and change 
(Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016; Vergne & Wry, 2014), institutional change (Khaire & 
Wadhwani, 2010; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003), strategic reorientation (Fiss & Zajac, 2006), 
product development (Seidel & O’Mahony, 2014) and organizational change (Bartunek & 
Franzak, 1988; Reger, Gustafson, Demarie, & Mullane, 1994).  
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Frames are effective when they invoke meanings, categories, or beliefs that are especially 
salient to both internal and external organizational audiences.  Frames achieve this via two main 
pathways: cognitive, through claimed beliefs and understandings; and expressive, through 
claimed appeals to feelings, aspirations, emotions or “passionate identification.”  The first 
pathway – cognitive – has been recognized as important in the strategic management literature 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2013); however, the latter – emotive – has been relatively neglected, but is an 
approach gaining scholarly attention (Giorgi, forthcoming; Voronov & Weber, 2016).   
We seek to elaborate how framing influences the adoption of non-incremental 
innovations in incumbent firms. Our unit of analysis is the TMT because they are charged with 
reviewing and evaluating innovations for adoption, as well as addressing the challenges of, and 
making strategic choices about, innovation adoption (e.g., Gilbert, 2005; O'Reilly & Tushman, 
2016; Sull, 1999). Our context is TMT decision-making about the adoption of non-incremental 
innovations (i.e., innovations that are inconsistent with current organizational strategy, product 
portfolios, or business models), because they challenge the TMT’s existing mental models (Barr, 
Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Weick, 1990) and necessitate fundamentally different framing and 
conceptualizations of organizational capabilities (e.g., O’Reilly and Tushman, 2016; Gans, 
2016).  Thus, it is a context in which TMT framing becomes especially salient and where its 
effectiveness has the potential to reshape the firm’s core capabilities and innovation decisions.   
We seek to make several contributions related to TMT framing and innovation adoption.  
First, we reconceptualize cognitive framing, which tends to be conceptualized as relatively static 
and immutable (Benford, 1997; Benner & Tripsas, 2012; Danneels, 2011), trapped by (Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000), or anchored to (Vergne & Wry, 2014), their extant cognition. This theorization is 
largely refuted by social movement studies (Benford & Snow, 2000) which allow for flexibility, 
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change, and adaptation in framing.  Our theorization focuses on explaining flexibility in framing, 
via categorization and capability construction, in the consideration of innovations that can be 
construed as inconsistent with the incumbent organization’s strategic focus or business models.  
Second, we expand current notions of strategic framing beyond cognition to include 
emotions, a topic that is gaining in currency as an organizational concern (Voronov & Weber, 
2016).  Moreover, incorporating the role of emotions offers a way of addressing gaps in the 
literature (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015), which has been faulted for its 
compartmentalization and lack of a unified theory (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Huff & Huff, 2000; 
Walsh, 1995).  Accounting for emotional framing allows the possibility for contrasting sets of 
innovation and organizational capabilities to remain coupled with an emotionally engaged TMT 
articulation and narrative (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Gardner, Anand, & Morris, 2008; Raisch 
& Tushman, 2016; Vuori & Huy, 2016). We suggest the likelihood of innovation adoption is 
accentuated if expanded cognitive frames emotionally resonate in the TMT. Although not all 
innovations may flourish, we argue that TMTs that build flexible cognitive frames, and couple 
these frames with emotional engagement, increase the likelihood of non-incremental innovation 
adoption. 
Third, we bring to the literature on strategic decision-making about innovation adoption a 
deeper understanding of managerial framing. Innovation is a site ripe with potential for framing 
ambiguity, contestation, and resistance (Lavie, 2006; Weick, 1990).  Building on existing 
research on cognitive framing in the context of innovation (e.g., Benner & Tripsas, 2012; Gavetti 
& Rivkin, 2007; Gilbert, 2006), we argue that frames can bend, flex and be more supple, so as to 
consider how even potentially competence-destroying technical innovations (e.g., Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986) can be hosted within existing organizational capabilities and the formal and 
  7
informal systems that form the organization’s architecture (Gulati, Puranam, & Tushman, 2012; 
Nadler & Tushman, 1989).  We acknowledge that broadened TMT cognitive framing must be 
coupled with complex, internally inconsistent capabilities and associated organizational 
architectures (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Essentially, this issue 
pivots on the question of whether the TMT is capable of thinking about organizational 
architectures that are seemingly contradictory or paradoxical (e.g., Smith, 2014). 
We develop a conceptual model to explain how TMT framing – both cognitive and 
emotional – affects the likelihood of non-incremental innovation adoption in incumbent firms. 
Our model advances a series of propositions that illuminate dimensions of TMT framing and its 
influence on adoption. In addition, we extend these effects over time, mapping the cyclical 
nature of this process.  We conclude by discussing the implications of our conceptual model for 
theory, research, and practice. 
INNOVATION ADOPTION AND TMT FRAMING IN INCUMBENT FIRMS:             
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
An organization considers the adoption of a target innovation in order to seize 
competitive advantage of new market opportunities or to respond to non-routine change 
(Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997; Levinthal & March, 1993).  Although they may not be 
universally novel, innovations are locally novel, being new and useful to the adopting firm 
(Amabile, 1988; Glynn, 1996; Kanter, 1983; Van de Ven, 1986).  Innovations fall into three 
distinct types: incremental (Christensen, 1997; Dosi, 1982), architectural (Henderson & Clark, 
1990), or discontinuous (Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, & Anderson, 2002).  Incremental 
innovations are similar to the existing offerings in the firm’s portfolio and thus build on, and 
extend, the organization’s preexisting capabilities and knowledge bases. Incremental innovation 
is the least challenging of the three in organizational adoption, as it necessitates minimal 
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strategic or organizational change; thus, the need for TMT framing is lowest in this case.  
Architectural innovations, by contrast, trigger substantial organizational changes when adopted.  
They reconfigure existing organizational components while leaving the core design concepts 
(and thus the basic knowledge underlying the components) untouched. Because architectural 
innovations require significant shifts in interfaces and linkages across product/service 
components, “some of what the firm knows is not only not useful but may actually handicap the 
firm” (Henderson and Clark 1991: 10, 13).  Similarly, discontinuous innovations are challenging 
to adopt because they require new capabilities, processes, and knowledge that radically redefine 
and extend existing capabilities and technologies (Corso & Pellegrini, 2007) and with it, initiate 
deep-seated strategic and organizational change (Adner, 2012; Schilling, 2005).  
Because the adoption of either architectural or discontinuous innovations require the firm 
to make substantial changes in knowledge, capabilities and associated architectures (Dewar & 
Dutton, 1986), they both present significant obstacles for incumbent firms and make more 
demands for TMT framing.  Consequently, we group these two types of innovations – 
architectural and discontinuous – together under the umbrella of “non-incremental innovations.”1  
In contrast to incremental innovations, incumbent firms are less likely to adopt, or to 
incompetently adopt, non-incremental innovations (Henderson, 1993; Tushman & O'Reilly, 
2002).  For instance, incumbent firms such as Firestone (Sull, 1999), Smith Corona (Danneels, 
2011), Polaroid (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000), and Swiss watchmakers (Landes, 1983), struggled to 
manage non-incremental innovations because they provided the TMT “with options either to 
                                                 
1 Because their adoption presents similar and significant tensions to adopting firms, we group the architectural and 
discontinuous types together under the umbrella of “non-incremental innovations” to make our theorization more 
parsimonious. 
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reinforce or destabilize a technological regime” (Benner & Tushman, 2003: 242).  The decision 
to reinforce or destabilize the organization’s status is one that involves framing.     
When TMTs in incumbent firms consider an innovation for adoption, they do so in the 
context of the legacy strategy of the firm and its business model.  Whether a legacy strategy 
constrains or enables decision-making about innovation adoption, however, is in the province of 
the TMT’s construction of more or less flexible mental models (Barr et al., 1992): Generally 
speaking, strategic choices perceived to be consistent or aligned with the current organizational 
model are favored, while those that lie outside tend to be rejected.  And yet, this model of 
strategic choice seems to limit the functioning of the TMT to a simple binary determination of 
whether (or not) a target innovation is consistent (or inconsistent) with a current strategic frame. 
We allow for an alternative option, that the TMT cannot simply take the strategic frame as given 
but, instead, bend, flex or adapt it to the potential adoption of a target innovation.  
We advance a theoretical model (see Figure) proposing that the likelihood of 
organizational adoption of a non-incremental innovation is hinged to the TMTs’ framing of that 
innovation in the context of the firm’s legacy strategy.  We conceptualize framing as consisting 
of two pathways – cognitive and emotional – that together affect the TMT’s review and 
evaluation of the target innovation.  The core mechanism in framing effectiveness is that of 
flexibility, i.e., the TMT’s ability to bend or stretch existing conceptualizations, both cognitive 
and emotional, to appropriately align the innovation with the legacy organizational strategy and 
capabilities.  Cognitive flexibility, we argue, results from the dual processes of re-categorizing 
the organizational order at a higher or more abstract level of classification, and of reconciling 
inconsistent organizational capabilities and architectures; greater cognitive flexibility results in 
expanded framing of the innovation.  Emotional flexibility, we argue, results from a felt 
  10
alignment or passionate identification of the frame with organizational strategic goals or 
aspirations.  We theorize that TMT flexibility in both cognitive and emotional framing leads to 
strategic resonance with the focal innovation; in turn, this should increase the likelihood of the 
TMT adoption of the innovation. Moreover, we theorize the reverse, i.e., TMT inflexibility in 
cognitive and emotional framing will decrease the likelihood of adoption.  In addition, we 
propose that prior innovation adoption decisions accumulate over time to affect the 
organization’s innovation profile and the TMT’s capability to attend to non-incremental 
innovation.  Next, we detail our model and offer propositions that articulate our core arguments. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure About Here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Cognitive Frame Flexibility via Re-categorization 
In the strategic management literature, a cognitive frame refers to managerial mental 
maps (Barr et al, 1992), thought structures (Reger, 1990), schemata of interpretation (Gavetti & 
Rivkin, 2007), strategic frames (Huff, 1982), or more generally, “mental templates that 
individuals impose on the information environment to give it meaning” (Walsh, 1995: 281). 
Cognitive frames have been shown to be influential in several aspects of strategic decision-
making, including capability development (Benner & Tripsas, 2012), search and evaluation 
(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000), information processing (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014), and 
organizational change and innovation (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  Because senior teams 
process information collectively (Weick, 1993), their cognitive frames help them aggregate 
interrelated information (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978) when faced with ambiguity (Barr et al., 1992).   
A consistent theme that pervades this literature is that cognitive frames serve as an 
interpretive lens that help TMTs “filter” queues from their external environment and respond 
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accordingly (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). Helfat and Peteraf (2015) offer a theoretical bridge from 
managerial cognition to the literature on dynamic capabilities, explicating how cognition serves 
as an important microfoundation of dynamic capabilities (e.g., Teece, 2007).  They theorize that 
processes of sensing, seizing and reconfiguring dynamic capabilities are associated with a 
managerial cognitive capability – defined as “the capacity of an individual manager to perform 
one or more of the mental activities that comprise cognition” (Helfat and Peteraf, 2015: 835).   
As such, a TMT’s decision to adopt a new innovation, with its associated capabilities, 
depends on whether their cognitive frame filters the capability as a potential threat or opportunity 
to the existing organization (Benner & Tripsas, 2012; Gilbert, 2005; Staw, Sandelands, & 
Dutton, 1981; Tripsas, 2009).  Especially during periods of technological ferment, cognitive 
frames can get mired in legacy strategies and framings (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013) and, in turn, 
revert to overlearned behaviors (Staw et al., 1981).  Danneels (2011) offered an example of such 
a threat frame in his account of Smith-Corona’s failure to adapt to the rise of desktop computing; 
he showed how the TMT was unable shift resources toward new capabilities because of an 
entrenched cognitive frame anchored to typewriters.  Similarly, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) 
demonstrated that prior managerial cognitive representations posed the primary challenge to 
innovation adoption at Polaroid. Gilbert (2006) illustrated how competing cognitive frames of 
threat and opportunity led to the collapse of several newspapers following the rise of online 
news.  And, while these empirical cases suggest that cognitive frames may constrain innovation 
adoption, we argue the reverse: cognitive framing can enable innovation adoption, particularly 
when the TMT is capable of flexing or stretching the framing. 
To begin, the TMT’s consideration of a focal innovation is situated in their understanding 
of the organization’s legacy strategy (Adner, 2012; Dosi, 1982) and existing cognitive framing 
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(Walsh & Glynn, 2008), as well as the firm’s performance (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007; 
Greve & Taylor, 2000).  Innovation adoption necessitates cognitive work by the TMT that is 
directed towards the symbolization, interpretation, and emotional reconciliation of the incumbent 
firm’s past with its potential future, signaled by the innovation.  We propose that the TMT bends 
its cognitive framing effectively by broadening its categorical claims to construe its strategy at a 
higher, superordinate or more abstracted level.  This was evident, for instance, in Netflix’s 
construal as an entertainment company and its adoption of an online streaming platform.  
Rather than being fixed, such claims to the classification taxonomy can be supple in the 
hands of the TMT. The TMT can re-position the firm, moving it up or down in the taxonomic 
hierarchy, as “any object may be categorized at each of several different hierarchical levels” 
(Mervis & Rosch, 1981: 92).  The TMT accomplishes this by matching the strategic framing of 
the firm to the cognitive referent that customers, partners, analysts, employees, or other 
audiences “automatically recognize” as being the epitome of a category (Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009: 649); this involves claiming the firm as a prototype or exemplar that best represents the 
category identified. Well-known examples of prototypical representatives are Amazon in online 
commerce and, at one time, IBM in computing. Both firms expanded upon an initial product 
offering (e.g., books, mainframes) to later serve as a representative of much larger category. 
Prototypes, however, are more than lists of particular framing attributes “but, rather, fuzzy sets” 
that encapsulate the key features of group membership (Hogg & Terry, 2000: 123).   
Prototypical representativeness is gauged by how well an item fits its category (Mervis & 
Rosch, 1981), which has a bandwidth of acceptable variations among its members. This 
bandwidth affords the latitude for TMTs in claiming organizational membership at more 
superordinate or abstract categories as it furnishes the parameters for the ways in which the 
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cognitive frame can be stretched legitimately.  The boundaries defined by prototypical 
representativeness set up the rules for categorical inclusion and exclusion at different 
categorization levels in a classification hierarchy; in effect, this makes the implications of 
adopting a non-incremental innovation more clear and visible for the strategic positioning of the 
firm.  And so, Netflix’s claim to being an online entertainment firm suggests a more abstract 
description than its prior claim as a DVD-by-mail subscription rental company.   
Such framing flexibility is possible because categories are embedded in taxonomies, i.e. 
broader classification systems of meaning consisting of different, hierarchical levels of inclusion 
that range from superordinate to subordinate (Glynn & Navis, 2013). Mervis and Rosch (1981) 
define three key levels of vertical inclusion that describe classification hierarchies: (1) a basic 
level, consisting of the most typical and most used categories (e.g., perceiving an object as a 
table); (2) a subordinate level, located below basic level categories and having greater domain 
specificity and more concreteness (e.g., a dining room table; a bedside table; a coffee table); and 
(3) a superordinate level, located above the basic level and having lower domain specificity and 
greater abstractness (e.g., a piece of furniture)  As an organization moves up the classification 
hierarchy, as for example, from subordinate to superordinate categorization (e.g., Amazon’s shift 
from an online bookseller to online commerce retailer), prototype representativeness widens, to 
encompass all the subordinate categories that sit below it, thereby allowing more diversity in 
prototypicality at higher levels. Conversely, the prototype grows narrower as we move down the 
hierarchy to the subordinate level (e.g., sailboat maker Linjett’s decision to shift from ‘boat 
manufacturer’ to ‘custom sailing yacht’ producer) (Adner & Snow, 2010).   
In construing a strategic frame, the TMT makes two assessments: one, determining what 
the salient category is in the hierarchy, i.e., superordinate or subordinate; and two, assessing the 
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fitness of the firm as a prototype for that category. TMTs who engage in more flexible framing 
tend to categorically position the firm at a higher, more abstract level and to view a wider set of 
organizational offerings (or potential innovations) as fitting within that category. At these higher 
taxonomic levels, cognitive frames tend to be less domain-specific than at lower ones; this was 
illustrated, for instance, in Fuji’s shift from the subordinate category of film to the superordinate 
category of “imaging and information” (Tripsas, 2009: 455)  
Conversely, TMTs who engage in less flexible framing tend to strategically position the 
firm at a more subordinate level and to take a more limited or narrow view of what constitutes 
appropriate membership.  This is evident, for instance, in Kodak’s claims as a film company 
(Munir & Phillips, 2005) or Blockbuster’s as a bricks-and mortar video rental retailer (O'Reilly 
& Tushman, 2016). At these lower taxonomic hierarchies, cognitive frames tend to be more 
domain specific, more concrete, and less flexible.  Consequently, we propose: 
P1a: TMTs who classify a non-incremental innovation as consistent with the 
representative prototype of a superordinate (more abstract) hierarchical category are more 
likely to adopt the innovation. 
 
P1b: TMTs who classify a non-incremental innovation as consistent with the 
representative prototype of a subordinate (more concrete) hierarchical category are less 
likely to adopt the innovation. 
 
Cognitive Frame Flexibility via Capability Reconciliation 
Innovations can also vary in the extent to which they build on, fit with, and are 
commensurable with the firm’s existing capabilities and associated architecture (e.g., 
Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). As such, 
the second dimension of cognitive frame flexibility in our model defines how the TMT perceives 
the alignment between the non-incremental innovation and the firm’s existing organizational 
architecture, i.e., the capabilities, roles, culture, and structures that form the organization’s 
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formal and informal processes and structures (see Gulati et al., 2012; Nadler & Tushman, 1989) 
and, especially, how it can be reconciled with these capabilities and architectures (e.g., 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1993, 1996; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010).  Non-incremental innovations 
often rouse inconsistencies with the firm’s existing capabilities (e.g., Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; 
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008); for example, some innovations may be perceived as contradictory 
to the exploitation of existing capabilities and technologies, whereas others can be associated 
with the exploration of new capabilities (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).  
An important site where the cognitive framing of core capabilities is made visible is in 
the various products or outputs produced by the organization, which “are perceived to be made 
up of discrete attributes, with each attribute having a distinct subjective value” (Sujan, 1985: 31).  
Across the portfolio, the organization’s products or services may share few or many capabilities 
in common.  Because the adoption of a non-incremental innovation, by definition, permits 
radically new capabilities to penetrate the firm, adoption decisions force debates about whether 
or not the innovation is reconcilable with existing capabilities and architectures. For instance, in 
the 1960s, incumbent Swiss watchmaking executives perceived quartz watch technology through 
a frame that pitted the adoption of integrated circuitry found in quartz watches against nearly 300 
years of mechanical watchmaking prowess. As a result, most Swiss executives were unable to 
reconcile inconsistencies among the capabilities and architectures needed to produce both quartz 
and mechanical watches, and thus, failed to seize an emerging market for quartz technology 
(Landes, 1983). Alternatively, a cognitive frame that serves to bundle or “match” (Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2013) inconsistent organizational capabilities permits the TMT to reconcile and execute 
incremental as well non-incremental innovation via simultaneous exploitation and exploration 
(March, 1991; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008).   
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Scholars have highlighted how the process of matching old and new capabilities with 
competing framings creates cognitive complexity and dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Tripsas, 
2009).  For instance, Gilbert’s (2006) research on the digitalization of the newspaper industry 
questioned if competing cognitive frames could coexist. He argued that “response[s] to 
discontinuous [technological] change creates a cognitive paradox” and can only be resolved 
through “senior team frame integration” and by “embracing the competing frames” (Gilbert, 
2006: 150).  Because the adoption of non-incremental innovations often triggers ambiguous or 
competing tensions, TMTs who are able to develop a more flexible frame are more likely to 
reconcile and embrace contradictory innovations in a manner that accounts for “necessary 
paradox” (Smith, 2014: 1592). To account for these paradoxical inconsistencies, Smith (2014) 
found that effective TMTs attend to non-incremental innovations by rapidly shifting between 
decision-making and resource allocation processes. Likewise, Smith and Tushman (Smith & 
Tushman, 2005: 523) theorized that TMTs need to develop paradoxical cognition – “frames and 
processes that recognize and embrace contradiction” – which allows for the coexistence of 
contradictory capabilities and innovation agendas in the same organization. The need for senior 
managers to reconcile inconsistencies is not only a property of innovation adoption. Recent 
research on organizational hybridity (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & 
Model, 2015; Besharov & Smith, 2014), for example, explicates a similar call for TMTs to 
reconcile competing organizational frames in service of doing good and doing well.   
In sum, we posit that a TMT’s ability to develop more flexible cognitive frames to 
reconcile inconsistent capabilities and architectures (Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Benner and 
Tushman, 2002) is central to non-incremental innovation adoption. The ability to attend to such 
internal inconsistencies is another aspect of cognitive frame flexibility.  More formally, we posit:  
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P2a: TMTs who are able to reconcile inconsistent capabilities and architectures 
associated with the non-incremental innovation are more likely adopt the innovation. 
 
P2b: TMTs who are unable to reconcile inconsistent capabilities and architectures 
associated with the non-incremental innovation are less likely adopt the innovation. 
 
Cognitive Frame Expansion or Contraction 
 
The two aspects of cognitive framing in our model are conjoined in construing how the 
TMT perceives a non-incremental innovation. We consider the interaction of the vertical 
dimension (categorization hierarchies) and the horizontal dimension (capability reconciliation) of 
cognitive frame flexibility, and their possible impacts on the TMT’s adoption decision. The most 
clear-cut cases of interaction effects occur when the two dimensions act in concert, each 
amplifying the effects of the other.  These cases are the two displayed on the diagonals of the 
Figure: expansion of the cognitive framing via more flexibility (top right cell; P3a) and 
contraction of frames via less flexibility (bottom left cell; P3b).  Expansion occurs when the 
TMT holds a cognitive frame that includes a high level of classification and reconciles capability 
and architectural inconsistencies. While each dimension independently leads to more expanded 
frames, together they interact to amplify the expansion, and therefore, the likelihood of non-
incremental adoption.  Thus, the top-right corner illustrates the most flexible condition of 
cognitive framing to facilitate non-incremental adoption.   
Several empirical studies offer glimpses to illustrate the interaction of both dimensions of 
cognitive frame expansion.  For instance, Amazon expanded its hierarchal frame from being a 
web-based bookseller to “an online technology platform,” a superordinate category that was 
more abstract, superseding its original domains of business activity (Stone, 2013). At the same 
time, its TMT permitted novel capabilities and architectures related to cloud-based services to 
co-evolve that were inconsistent with those established when the company launched as an online 
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bookseller. Similarly, Post 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recast its hierarchical 
frame as one of protection from criminal activities and, instead, as a “threat-based intelligence-
led” agency. To complement this higher categorical framing, Gulati, Raffaelli and Rivkin (2016) 
illustrated how the FBI Director embedded new capabilities into local field offices that allowed 
for law enforcement and cyber-terrorism capabilities to coexist.  And, Martha Stewart claimed a 
superordinate innovation frame in naming her business Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia to 
reflect a focus on “lifestyle” that could transcend specific domains of life and be disseminated 
across multiple media channels that each required novel capabilities to grow (e.g., magazines, 
books, television and radio programming and online activities) (Glynn, 2011; Glynn & Dowd, 
2008). In all these cases, the TMT’s expanded both dimensions of their cognitive frame flexibly 
to become more abstract, blanketing a wide array of products, offerings, and missions. These 
expanded frames were each coupled to a set of inconsistent capabilities. Thus, we propose:   
P3a: TMTs who classify a non-incremental innovation as consistent with the 
representative prototype of a superordinate category and build internally inconsistent 
organizational capabilities are more likely to adopt the innovation. 
 
The second case of clear-cut interaction effects is just the reverse of expansion: cognitive 
frame contraction.  Cognitive frame contraction occurs when the TMT construes the frame both 
in terms of a subordinate (more concrete) level of classification and perceives it as inconsistent 
with existing capabilities and architectures.  Both of these aspects of cognitive flexibility – 
subordinate classification and irreconcilable inconsistencies among capabilities – independently 
lead to more concrete, domain specific, and sometimes fragmented cognitive frames. Together 
they interact to amplify a contraction of the TMT’s innovation frame.  
For instance, when faced with the initial decision to explore online streaming, 
Blockbuster’s TMTs deferred to a subordinate classification as a brick-and-mortar video retailer 
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and was unable to embrace the capabilities and organizational architectures required to deliver 
the same content to their existing customers across multiple distribution channels. Similarly, 
Kodak executives struggled to move beyond a subordinate classification as “a film company” 
(rather than an imaging company) because they generally perceived digital film production 
possessed few capabilities related to chemical film processing (Swasy, 1997). We propose:  
P3b: TMTs who classify a non-incremental innovation as consistent with the 
representative prototype of a subordinate category and do not build internally inconsistent 
organizational capabilities are less likely to adopt the innovation.  
 
The off-diagonal boxes represent instances of cognitive framing where the two aspects 
are in a state of disequilibrium: the TMT’s categorization hierarchy is inconsistent with how they 
attend to capability inconsistencies. Such cognitive inconsistencies create uncertainty and reduce 
the probability of the non-incremental innovation’s adoption. This is evident in the case of Smith 
Corona (see Danneels, 2011), which originated as a typewriter company, but attempted to 
expand its hierarchical frame to become a “small business office supplier.”  However, in spite of 
invoking the more abstract, superordinate category, the TMT continued to attend only to those 
capabilities associated with typewriter production and outsourced all other aspects of product 
development. The hierarchical frame at Smith Corona was intendedly abstract, but the TMTs 
inability to reconcile capabilities remained unaddressed. As demand for typewriters continued to 
slow, such cognitive disequilibrium facilitated the company’s eventual demise.   
Similarly, when the TMT maintains a more concrete and subordinate hierarchical frame, 
but is able to reconcile the coexistence of multiple inconsistent capabilities, disequilibrium again 
ensues.  This is evident in the case of Time Warner and TIME magazine. Although the TMT of 
Time Warner attempted to reconcile the inconsistent capabilities required to develop TIME 
magazine’s print and digital news content, they were unable to develop a hierarchical frame that 
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engendered a more abstract, superordinate level classification for TIME magazine alongside 
Time Warner’s other media offerings in television and online media. As a result, TIME 
magazine was eventually spun-off, turning the magazine back into an independent property 
(Smith, 2016).  The effect of this inconsistency was to embrace new capabilities, but to keep 
them localized in particular domains and without a more expansive frame to hold them together.  
Thus, when the framing of categorization hierarchies and capability inconsistencies are at odds 
with each other, a state of disequilibrium ensues.  We propose:  
P3c: TMTs who frame the non-incremental innovation in both expanded and contracted 
terms create ambiguity and inconsistencies that are associated with a lower likelihood to 
adopt the innovation.  
 
Emotional Frame Flexibility   
In addition to cognitive framing, a TMT’s framing process also involves emotional 
elements (e.g., Giorgi, forthcoming; Huy, 2002; Vuori & Huy, 2016). In studying social 
movements, Robnett (2004: 195) identified a key role for emotions and, especially emotional 
resonance, i.e., “the degree of ‘emotional harmony between ideology, practices…or frames.”  In 
particular, this research has shown that emotional arousal, displays, and identification are critical 
to change (Davis, Morrill, Rao, & Soule, 2008). Giorgi (forthcoming) explains that framing 
needs to achieve “emotional embeddedness in its institutional or organizational setting…[and] 
evoke emotions that are in line with a predominant institutional ethos…or an organization’s 
culture.”  Emotional framing involves alignment between symbols and more enduring themes 
(Gamson, 1988) that make a non-incremental innovation feel emotionally engaging and sensible.  
Research on social movements (e.g., Thoits, 1989) has shown how cognitive frames elicit 
positive emotions when they resonate with participants’ values, beliefs, and ideas and reinforce 
existing cultural narratives and understandings (Robnett, 2004: 197).  Thus, organizations tend to 
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prescribe appropriate emotional aspirations and displays (Voronov & Vince, 2012; Voronov & 
Weber, 2016) that can induce change and adaptation.   
Emotional framing can function to help resolve inconsistent sets of organizational 
capabilities, which typically trigger threat or rigid behaviors and internal inertial forces (e.g., 
Gilbert, 2006; Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006) by linking a non-incremental innovation with an 
emotionally engaging and abstract competitive vision (e.g., Rotemberg & Saloner, 2000; Van 
den Steen, 2005). According to Fiske and Pavelchak (1986), when individuals are exposed to 
novelty, they assign “affective tags” to their evaluative appraisals.  Dutton and Jackson (1987) 
demonstrated the relevance of such evaluative appraisals to strategic issue responses.  Citing 
Fiske’s body of work (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984), they noted how “Evaluative appraisals are the 
affective components of cognitions…[and] may attract people to become associated with an 
opportunity and repel people from becoming involved with an issue labeled a threat” (Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987: 82). 
For example, Fuji’s TMT was able to articulate a vision rooted in a set of values 
associated with being a world-class “imaging and information” company (Tripsas, 2013). Ravasi 
and Schultz (2006) and Rindova, Dalpiaz and Ravasi (2011) demonstrated how framing 
anchored in opportunity narratives facilitated positive emotional responses to organizational 
change. Alternatively, Gilbert (2005) observed how incumbent print media firms failed to change 
organizational strategies in response to web media because of emotionally resonate threat 
perceptions that emerged from individual self-narratives. Such threat narratives have been shown 
to trigger affective responses related to avoidance (Gavetti & Menon, 2016) and passive-
aggressive ambivalence (Ashforth, Rogers, Pratt, & Pradies, 2014).  
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Building on Selznick’s (1957) notion of “infusing the organization with value”, 
emotional framing enables a positioning of the non-incremental innovation in the context of the 
firm’s history and normative values. Following this line of thought, we argue that the emotional 
framing associated with a non-incremental innovation will, in turn, affect the TMT’s adoption 
decision. We propose:  
P4a: When TMTs emotionally frame a non-incremental innovation in ways that 
expressively resonate with organizational aspirations, values or culture, they are more 
likely to adopt the innovation. 
 
P4b: In the absence of TMT’s emotional framing of a non-incremental innovation, TMTs 
are less likely to adopt the innovation.   
 
When TMTs are able to attach an emotionally engaging aspiration to a non-incremental 
innovation, doing so permits, justifies, and contextualizes a more flexible cognitive frame. Thus, 
we theorize that cognitive and emotional frames are inextricably related to innovation adoption 
decisions. Relatedly, Rindova and Petkova (2007: 220) found that both emotional and cognitive 
factors influenced how early consumer adopters perceived the potential value of novel products 
and innovations, noting that that cognition and emotion were “intertwined in the process of 
forming perceptions of the value of a product innovation.” We posit a similar interaction 
between cognitive and emotional frame flexibility among members of the TMT as they evaluate 
possible innovations. For example, the TMT at Ciba Geigy’s Crop Protection Division justified 
their expansion from chemical products to chemical and biological products by associating the 
shift with their aspiration to “Keep Plants Healthy.” This new expanded cognitive frame 
emotionally resonated with TMT’s values and aspirations to improve the condition of the planet 
and the environment (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2016). Thus, we posit that framing flexibility is a 
function of both cognition and emotion. Absent TMT emotional engagement, the team is less 
likely to engage in the work necessary to execute the expanded cognitive frames. We propose:   
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P4c: Increased TMT emotional resonance will enhance the relationship between 
expansive cognitive framing and the likelihood of innovation adoption.   
 
TMT Framing and Innovation Adoption Over Time 
We include a feedback loop in our model (see Figure) that cycles back from a one-time 
decision to adopt (or not adopt) an innovation to capture the recurring rounds and cumulative 
effects of multiple adoption decisions over time. The recursive nature of our model accounts for 
the possibility that, over time, the TMT learns from prior successes and failures in making 
adoption decisions (Levitt & March, 1988; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) to develop their 
capabilities for cognitive framing (and re-framing). Like other forms of organizational learning, 
we theorize that TMTs can develop, manage, and hone their ability to develop more flexible 
frames over time as one cycle affects the next (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Like other forms of 
capability development, we posit that TMTs can utilize “feedback from previous experience” to 
consider current options for innovation adoption (March & Olsen, 1976: 148).   
Developing the TMT capability to manage the work of framing – and ultimately, the 
potential to effectively expand frames cognitively and emotionally – provides strategic 
flexibility.  Such processes occur when TMTs leverage past experience to develop strategic 
capabilities and learn (e.g., Adler & Clark, 1991; Argote, McEvily, & Reagans, 2003; Argyris, 
1976).  For example, Weigelt and Sarkar (2009: 52) argue that firms “face knowledge hurdles 
when adopting a certain type of innovation, partly because adoption-enabling knowledge is 
experiential and based on learning.” The authors found that the adoption of electronic banking 
solutions among credit unions was facilitated by learning to exploit external knowledge through 
marketing efforts. More generally, several mechanisms have been shown to facilitate TMT 
learning as it relates to innovation adoption, including the willingness to experiment (Thomke, 
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1998; Weigelt & Sarkar, 2009), knowledge diversity (Fichman & Kemerer, 1997) and a culture 
that emphasizes participative decision-making (Hurley & Hult, 1998).  
We argue that a TMT’s ability to engage in more flexible framing is contingent on 
adaptive learning processes that foster TMT experimentation with more abstract cognitive 
frames that are anchored on an emotionally engaging aspiration. These processes are contingent 
on the TMTs general ability to develop capabilities important to organizational functioning and 
performance.  Tushman and O’Reilly (2002) illustrated how at USA Today, after several 
attempts to implement digitized content in the context of print content, was able to articulate an 
expanded frame for the organization (e.g., “the world’s leading news organization”) and create a 
set of processes that permitted the organization to leverage its content across platforms in a way 
to enhance its brand. Alternatively, Time Warner and TIME magazine’s inability to forge an 
expanded overarching frame to take advantage of leveraging its various brands stunted the ability 
of TIME magazine to stand alongside other digital and print media outlets. Without learning, 
frames are likely to be reinforced and unchanged over time.  
In addition, the TMT’s ability to engage in frame expansion is likely related to their 
ability to reach consensus on the appropriateness of adopting an innovation; because frame 
expansion (or contraction) furnishes a reference for adoption decisions, TMT consensus seems 
more achievable.  Attewell’s (1992: 6) work on accumulated learning highlights how TMTs 
develop knowledge contingent on “individual insights and skills becom[ing] embodied in 
organizational routines, practices, and beliefs that outlast the presence of the originating 
individual.” Fiske and Pavelchak (1986: 196) illustrate how such recursive patterns can reinforce 
consensus building over time:  
When certain decisions are made regularly, groups may develop consensual ways to 
categorize the entity…. Consensus on categorization may or may not emerge as a result 
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of group interaction, but lack of consensus would be most problematic if alternative 
views were evaluatively (rather than descriptively) inconsistent. 
 
Finally, if the TMT is unable to develop more expansive frames, individual members are 
likely to maintain their individual interpretive schemes, akin to separate and distinct “thought 
worlds” that have been previously shown to prevent consensus on innovation adoption decisions 
(Dougherty, 1992). We posit that TMTs who develop the capability to manage cognitive framing 
more effectively over time are likely to learn from prior innovation adoption experiences and 
develop consensual mental models that promote learning and development. We propose:  
P5: TMTs who attend to expanded frames over time are more likely to learn from their 
prior non-incremental innovation adoption experiences. 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
Organizations continuously face decisions about whether or not to adopt innovations 
(e.g., Gupta et al., 2006).  As technologies evolve, failing to innovate has a significant impact on 
a firm’s ability to compete (Abernathy, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1991).  Often, however, 
organizations do not adopt an innovation, even when they have the organizational capacity to do 
so (e.g., Landes, 1983), or they develop innovations they cannot execute (e.g., Benner & 
Tushman, 2015; Christensen, 1997).  These challenges are accentuated when the innovation 
violates a long-standing view of the organization’s strategy (Vuori & Huy, 2016), a prior history 
of success (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008) or embedded institutional norms (Fox-Wolfgramm, 
Boal, & Hunt, 1998). Although these factors are important, we have argued that a distinct source 
of inertia is rooted in framing. Cognitive and emotional framing have largely been omitted 
variables in these accounts (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Giorgi, forthcoming; Vuori & Huy, 2016).   
We advance a model revealing the role of framing in innovation adoption and explore 
how TMT frames affect the perceived “goodness of fit” and emotional resonance with non-
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incremental innovations, which ultimately affects innovation adoption decisions. Moreover, we 
proposed that the effects of these processes accumulate over time, as the TMT’s attention to, and 
reflection on, the individual adoption decisions builds capabilities for effective cognitive and 
emotional framing and broaden the diversity of innovations adopted by an organization.  Our 
model has important implications for both theory and practice. 
Theoretical Implications  
Our primary goal is to strengthen the bridge between the domains of organizational 
strategy, innovation, and cognition. We believe our work advances theory and practice in a 
number of ways. First, we contribute to a rich stream of research on innovation adoption by 
theorizing how cognitive frames inform managerial choices about whether or not to adopt 
innovations. At key junctures in product class evolution, the movement toward a more expanded 
cognitive frame, and in turn, innovation adoption, may have survival value for the firm. For 
instance, at the closing of industry standards and/or at the initiation of non-incremental technical 
change, the ability to develop a more abstract cognitive frame relative to a new innovation 
permits TMTs to more accurately understand strategic options and permits members of the firm 
and external constituents to better understand and execute strategic shifts.  When such strategic 
junctures occur, the ability of the TMT to cognitively reframe in more expansive terms is 
particularly important because it helps conceptualize technological shifts as connected with 
broader opportunities (as opposed to threats).  
Second, we believe our treatment of cognitive frames affords new insights for cognition 
scholarship. We theorize that cognitive frames not may be static, but instead, may be flexible and 
mutable. Prior conceptualizations of cognitive frames have focused on frames “as ‘things,’ rather 
than on the dynamic processes associated with their social construction, negotiation, 
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contestation, and transformation” (Benford, 1997: 415 in Croteau & Hicks, 2003). Our 
theorization and application of cognitive flexibility attends to calls within the strategy literature 
to more fully account for how cognitive frames influence the competitive dynamics of strategic 
decision making within the firm (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Livengood & Reger, 2010).  Our work 
exposes how cognitive flexibility via hierarchical categorization and capability reconciliation can 
influence a TMT’s adoption decisions.  We posit that cognitive framing, like other dynamic 
managerial capabilities, requires “managing, or ‘orchestrating,’ the firm’s resources to address 
and shape rapidly changing business environments” (Teece, 2014: 328). More specifically, we 
explicate how a TMT’s cognitive frame influences strategic decision-making and that the active 
management of this process has substantial strategic value for the firm.   
Third, we extend current notions of strategic framing to include a role for emotions. 
While cognitive framing of innovations and organizational capabilities is necessary, we argue it 
is not sufficient for TMT innovation adoption.  We theorize that expanded cognitive framing 
must also be coupled with the TMT’s emotional engagement in the expanded frame.  Thus, our 
model also addresses how “thinking” (cognitive framing) and “feeling” (emotional framing) 
interact to facilitate non-incremental adoption decisions.   
Finally, we answer calls in the innovation literature to theorize the underlying micro-
mechanisms underpinning how individuals and teams balance decision-making processes related 
exploration and exploitation (Gupta et al., 2006). When TMTs are able to develop a more 
flexible and expansive cognitive and emotional frame, it can function as a filter for guiding 
proactive change in either shaping dominant technological designs or initiating competence 
destroying technical change (Tushman & Anderson, 1986).  Under a range of conditions, the 
infusion of organizations with appropriate meaning (Pfeffer, 1981; Selznick, 1957; Weick, 1979) 
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may be as strategically important as the content of strategy itself (e.g., Glynn, 2000).  Similarly, 
recent work has exposed the salience of cognition and capability development (Eggers & Kaplan, 
2013), highlighting the importance of aligning managerial beliefs with market opportunities. If 
so, those more traditional analytic strategic capabilities found within the TMT must be 
complemented with the ability to function as skilled cultural operators in managing cognitive 
framing, along with affect and emotion (e.g., Huy, 2002).  
 While our theorization focuses primarily on the relationship between innovation and 
framing, we do not mean to suggest that cognitive and emotional frames are the entire 
explanation for adoption.  We recognize that other factors also influence TMT’s adoption 
decisions. Technical factors, such as whether the innovation is competency-enhancing or 
competency-destroying (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), will certainly impact the TMT’s 
willingness to engage in explorative innovation activity and consider new adoptions. Likewise, 
structural factors, such functional differentiation and team size have been shown to influence 
adoption decisions (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981).  Finally, institutional factors related to the 
“increased density of interaction, information flows, and membership identification” among 
members of the focal organization with other organizations in the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983: 148) have been shown to be influenced by additional normative, regulative, and socio-
cognitive factors (Scott, 2008) that promote innovation diffusion.   
We also acknowledge the boundary conditions of this work.  Our conceptual model 
assumes that the adoption of an innovation is in the best interest of the adopting firm (e.g., 
Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997; Kimberly, 1981; Rogers, 1995). But this may not always 
be the case.  Future scholars could explore the conditions, if any, where a more subordinate and 
concrete cognitive frame might be a viable and appropriate response. For example, some 
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scholars have studied successful incumbent firms that chose not to adopt the non-incremental 
innovation (e.g., Henderson, 1995; Raffaelli, 2013). Also, our model is agnostic about whether 
cognitive and emotional framing is managed differently depending on whether the new 
innovation originates from an exogenous or endogenous source.  Parsing out the role that 
framing flexibility plays in these different types of circumstances could lead to additional 
theoretical insights.  Finally, research that further explores the sequencing and interaction of 
emotional and cognitive framing in the context of innovation adoption could entice scholars from 
multiple domains to collaborate. 
We sought to provoke new research that links innovation and cognition, especially for 
strategy and innovation scholars who have largely overlooked this relationship (Kaplan & 
Tripsas, 2008).  Future researchers will be tasked with operationalizing and testing the various 
aspects of our model.  Here we offer some initial ideas to advance empirical work.  To begin, we 
envision many opportunities to model TMT frame flexibility. We could imagine, for example, 
that archival textual analysis of mission statements, company logos and annual reports will serve 
as viable sources of data (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). Using methods such as linguistic category 
modeling (Semin & Fiedler, 1991) could be especially useful in tracking how the language in 
these data sources vary in level of abstraction (e.g., Reyt & Wiesenfeld, 2015). Alternatively, 
data related to the products and technologies that categorize legacy as well as the future may be 
most easily accessible through external company announcements of new products, services, 
patent filings, or alliance partnerships.  Internal, archival sources of company data that report 
early stage research and development allocations may also prove suitable, especially for 
evaluating how framing flexibility influences the adoption of innovations that are incubated 
within the organization, but are never fully adopted.    
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We believe opportunities for empirical work are especially plentiful should scholars 
follow the historical evolution of firms that have adopted multiple innovations over time.  3M, 
for instance, was founded as a mining company but then made shifts into waterproof sandpaper, 
masking tape, Post-It notes, pharmaceuticals, and flexible circuits. Intel successfully moved from 
making memory to computer processors. Using archival data to track how a TMT frames evolve 
across multiple technological transitions could provide helpful insights. Drawing from Selznick’s 
(1957) work on value infusion, emotional framing flexibility might be found in normative value 
claims associated with the organization’s character or identity (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), 
claims for consistency or continuity over time (e.g., Schultz & Hernes, 2013), and collectivity or 
integrity of the organization as a whole (e.g., Raffaelli & Glynn, 2015) 
We believe that the study of innovation and frame flexibility is well suited for both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of inquiry.  To date, the bulk of the innovation literature that 
accounts for cognition has been qualitative in nature (e.g., Danneels, 2011; Gilbert, 2006).  
Building on this tradition, we see the value of studies that use non-participant observation to 
follow how TMTs develop, maintain or shift cognitive frames when making innovation adoption 
decisions.  Alternatively, more research employing mixed methods would also be beneficial.  For 
example, scholars might pair qualitative work with generalizable quantitative models to evaluate 
patterns of frame flexibility over time (e.g., Eggers & Kaplan, 2009). Of particular interest would 
be to test for shifts in frames by industry or moments in history.  
A helpful instrument to measure perceptions of the relationship between frame flexibility  
and strategy might be the series of overlapping circles employed by marketing and 
organizational identification scholars (e.g., Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000). These measures capture 
the degree of intersection between an individual’s cognitive frame and that of the firm. Likewise, 
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scholars might also examine how TMTs sequence their attention to the central aspects of a 
specific cognitive frame compared to the innovation adoption decisions they make over time.  
Attention to frame flexibility at certain stages of a change effort may vary, for instance, 
depending on the stage of the organization’s lifecycle or the type of technological shock the firm 
faces (e.g., exogenous or endogenous; discontinuous, architectural, or incremental). 
Finally, an organization’s performance context may affect the nature of frame flexibility. 
For example, organizations can proactively adopt innovations to initiate technological 
discontinuities for potential strategic gain (e.g., Adner, 2012; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2013) before 
they are forced to; alternatively, firms must sometimes move reactively, under performance 
shortfall conditions, to their competitor’s strategic moves (e.g., Rosenbloom & Christensen, 
1994; Siggelkow, 2001). The ordering of cognitive and emotional framing and innovation 
adoption may be contingent on whether the shifts are initiated opportunistically or reactively. It 
may be that those most effective proactive technological transitions will be initiated by shifts in 
framing followed by shifts in non-incremental adoption patterns. In contrast, reactive 
technological transitions will be initiated by shifts in frames followed by shifts in innovation 
adoption (e.g., Gulati et al., 2016).  Future research looking into whether proactive or reactive 
innovation adoption decisions influence cognitive flexibility would be worthwhile. Scholars may 
also find value in examining whether the role of frame flexibility differs when firms adopt 
incremental, as opposed to non-incremental, innovations.  
Managerial Implications  
Ever more frequently, dominant designs shift and technological discontinuities require 
firms to adopt innovations (Benner & Tripsas, 2012). Product or service modularization and 
decreasing information processing costs accentuate these dynamics (Altman, Nagle, & Tushman, 
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2015; Lakhani et al., 2013), creating pressures for TMTs to redefine reframe their mental models 
while continuing to develop capabilities and product category variants.  Maintaining clearly 
defined boundaries for product category membership is often associated with efficiency, 
productivity, and short-term performance (e.g., March, 1991; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2013) when 
conditions are relatively unchanging. Yet, at key junctures of change in a product class, at the 
closure of industry standards, and at competence destroying technical transitions, a concrete 
definition of the firm’s innovation boundaries holds firms hostage to their past (Sull, 1999).  We 
have shown that at firms like Kodak and Blockbuster, the TMT’s cognitive frame lead them to 
code these transitions and external changes as threats. Such interpretations stunt the firm’s ability 
to adapt to technical transitions.  
In sharp contrast, if the TMT is able to articulate a more expanded cognitive frame, they 
are likely to be more creative in attending to, and dealing with, these transitions. Further, the 
articulation of a more abstract cognitive frame helps organization members understand and get 
emotionally engaged in the transformation. For example, Tushman and O’Reilly (2016) 
articulated how the Ball Corporation’s aspiration to become a “world-class container firm” 
helped its TMT convince employees and external stakeholders of its moves from glass to metal 
to plastic containers over several decades. This ability to initiate, shape, and execute such 
cognitive and emotional transitions has important strategic ramifications.  
Confronting a technological discontinuity is a difficult challenge for any TMT, but 
incumbent firms have been shown to successfully host non-incremental innovations and 
technological change (e.g., Boumgarden, Nickerson, & Zenger, 2012; Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000). While complex strategies and associated decentralized or ambidextrous structures are 
important (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2013; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003), the TMT’s ability to pay 
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equal attention to the process and mechanisms of cognitive framing and emotional engagement 
may be just as critical.     
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Figure: TMT Frame Flexibility and Innovation Adoption  
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